The courts in MN are united in denying justice!

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A11-0276

Marvin Pirila,

Petitioner,

Gail Francette,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Duane Grace,

Respondent,

John Gulland, et al.,

Respondents.

O R D E R

Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition of Marvin Pirila for further review

be, and the same is, denied.

Dated: October 26, 2011

BY THE COURT:

/s/

Lorie S. Gildea

Chief Justice

Building Codes Life-Issue Hypocrits

Everyday our ex-building inspector, John Gulland, climbs the stairs of the Duluth City Hall to his Building Codes Administration job he ignores the same "life-safety" issues he strongly endorses.  The railings are too low and there are no guard rails.  These are "life-safety" items pursuant to the building codes, argued by Mr. Gulland, to those building new homes or renovating.  True "life-safety" items are ignored in existing structures while required of those seeking building permits.  Are we to believe that there is some "magical" safety net for "grandfathered" buildings, well remaining true life-safety issues for new or renovation projects?  The argument lacks common sense and logic.  Is there some "mystical" reason that a life-safety issue is not the same life-safety issue under similar circumstances? 

For the record, when Mr. Gulland inspected our building he didn't use either the guard rail or railing when walking up and down the stairs.  Isn't this a life-saving requirement?  Was he risking his life and our liability by acting so recklessly?

While we're talking about ridiculous codes, and ridiculous acts of building inspectors, lets address hand rails some more.  Hand rails have to run continuously without breaks from beginning to end.  If there was a break, a person would have to find the next section that might be as far away as two feet.  They would perish for sure before they figured that out.  This too is a life-safety issue.

Doors likewise must open outward with panic door handles.  Why?  When there is a panic of people in a fire they may run into each other and all perish because they can't turn a regular handle.  With our apartment complex, we might have as many as six or eight people wanting to get out a single door and they wouldn't know what to do.

Then there are the door closers...in a fire it is assumed that everyone will panic and forget to close the doors on the way out allowing the fire to spread.  The theme throughout these requirements is that people are "too stupid" to keep their head in emergency situations.  The dozens of fire drills and emergency procedures we have programmed into our heads must be compensated for by these "wise" building inspectors that know so much more than us.

Building codes, much like most government regulations, have spun out of control and overly oppressing to anyone wanting to do work requiring a building permit.  If there is a single incident, someone wants to enact another building code requirement to cover it.  If the same rules were applied to driving, all of us would be driving about 5 mph, with surround air bags, there would be guard rails, our cars would have to have government checks every 5,000 miles, and we would be restricted from traveling on any day the weather was bad.  Look around you...how many of the existing buildings and homes were built before there were thousands of pages of building codes that are still standing strong.  The answer is...nearly every one.  The only ones benefitting from over-regulation are building inspectors, plan reviewers, architects, designers, and government.  It's difficult to earn equity when you start with a loss of several thousands of dollars lost to ridiculous building codes and unreasonable enforcement.

Private Property

The Founders believed the basic rights of mankind came directly and exclusively from God. Therefore, they were to be maintained sacred and inviolate. William Blackstone, in “Commentaries on the Laws of England,” wrote “…natural rights...no human legislature has power to abridge or destroy them, unless the owner shall himself commit some act that amounts to forfeiture.” (Commentaries, 1:93).
These “natural” rights are inherent rights given to us by the Creator, and thus “UNALIENABLE.” Among Unalienable Rights are 1) the right to own, develop, and dispose of property and 2) The right to privacy.

As owners of the Old Washington School in Esko, Minnesota, we were told by building inspector John Gulland what and when we could do something. Even though he was wrong on several accounts, Thomson Township (Esko) officials stood behind him under the guise of “immunity.” The argument of the state is that individuals would not take these jobs (building inspectors, guardian ad litems, fire chiefs, etc.) if they were held liable. All of us in one capacity or another are liable for our actions. Why would a person turn down these jobs, which are like any other job? The argument is moot and has been largely discarded by the majority of the states. Minnesota, however, holds onto this “false” concept, refusing to allow exceptions to immunity that are written into law and is there to afford individuals some form of protection.

Case law and appellate court decisions continue to support the ideology of “absolute immunity” to all city, state, county, and local municipal workers. Without liability, there are many individuals being persecuted and forced into secrecy. They are afraid of retaliation or future problems. From my own personal experiences, these fears are well founded. The protection afforded these protected individuals is so great they embolden them to take whatever actions they want without fear of liability or consequence.

The building inspector and local fire chief made entry onto our private property without consent, or even attempted consent. They also had no subpoena or emergency reason for justifying entry. These were clear trespasses. These were continued attempts by local officials to thwart progress and create problems. More disturbingly is how they may have gained entrance in the first place. As the building was locked, how did they gain entry? The best guess is that they had retained their keys to the building after Thomson Township sold it. Many of the doors had not had their locks changed and they simply let themselves in. It turned out that Thomson Township didn't have a full accounting of keys for the building and these individuals would potentially have had these keys.

There were no vehicles in either lot when entry was made, so consent could not possibly have been sought. Both owners were just a simple phone call away and yet no attempt was made.

These entries were clear violations of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment (Amendment IV) to the United States Constitution is the part of the Bill of Rights which guards against unreasonable searches and seizures, along with requiring any warrant to be judicially sanctioned and supported by probable cause.

Blackstone included the right of “private property” as one of the three principals or primary articles of “natural rights.” He wrote that this right was our civil immunity “in their largest and most extensive sense (Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1:219-220: emphasis added.)

Frederic Bastiat, in “The Law,” pages 5-6, wrote “…the fact that life, liberty, and property existed beforehand [before law] that caused men to make laws [for the protection of them] in the first place [Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: The Foundation for Economic Education, Inc, 1974.

The Creator has imposed on every human being of normal mental capacity, among other, “The duty not to trespass on the property or privacy of another.” They also include the “duty to support personal and public standards of common decency” and “the duty to follow rules of moral rectitude.”

Gods’ revealed law provided true “justice” by requiring the wrong to pay the damages for losses he had caused. Punitive damages were assessed for the trouble he had caused and to remind him not to do it again. This was the law of “reparation” – repairing the damage.

As laws followed the need to protect the unalienable rights to property, trespasses lacking emergency life measures cannot be taken lightly. The fact that police require subpoena’s to search one’s property when the owner refuses shows the importance of private property rights. Even when a search is agreed too, consent may be withdrawn at any time by the owner.

Subpoena’s themselves are restricted, allowing its carrier to search only those areas specifically agreed to by the court. These are not intended to be mere fishing expeditions, but specific searches.

The manner in which the building inspector and fire chief made entry to our private property lacked proper consent, subpoena, or emergency justification. The right to privacy on ones property preceded law, and the law ultimately was created to legalize enforcement.

There is no law, nor could there be among man, that can supercede the unalienable right provided to all of us by our Creator. The duty of the court, judges, police, legislators, and county prosecutors is to protect this right to private property. There are only limited exceptions, when missing, must result in trespassing charges.

The biggest question in this matter is why the County Attorney, Thomas Pertler, has drug his feet on this matter for a year and a half. Is he afraid of upsetting Thomson Township and its Fire Department, perhaps wanting their vote for his elected position? One broken promise after another leaves one to wonder what justice is truly being served when the law is not upheld by those entrusted to enforce them.

Appellate Decision - What about the exceptions to immunity? They ignored them.

This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2010).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A11-276

Marvin Pirila,

Appellant,

Gail Francette,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Duane Grace,

Respondent,

John Gulland, et al.,

Respondents.

Filed August 22, 2011

Affirmed

Worke, Judge

Carlton County District Court

File No. 09-CV-10-934

Marvin Pirila (pro se appellant)

Steven L. Reyelts, Tracy A. Ward, Reyelts Bateman & Schramm, PLLC, Duluth,

Minnesota (for respondent Duane Grace)

Paul D. Reuvers, Stephanie A. Angolkar, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington, Minnesota (for

respondents John Gulland, et al.)

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Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Wright, Judge; and Willis,

Judge.*

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

WORKE, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment, arguing that

the district court erred by according respondents immunity as municipal authorities acting

within their official capacities. We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

Appellant Marvin Pirila challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment

in favor of respondents Thomson Township, John Gulland, Duane Grace, and Jeffrey

Juntunen. When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court determines whether

there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its

application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990).

Summary judgment is appropriately granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as

a matter of law.” Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993) (citing Minn. R.

Civ. P. 56.03). “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against

whom summary judgment was granted.” STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P.,

644 N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 2002). Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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whether the district court erred in its application of the law are reviewed de novo. Id. at

77.

In cases involving municipalities, summary judgment is appropriate when a

governmental entity has established that its actions are immune from civil liability.

Gutbrod v. County of Hennepin, 529 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Minn. App. 1995). A

municipality may be liable for torts committed by municipal officials, subject to certain

exceptions. Minn. Stat. § 466.02 (2010). One such exception exists for claims “based

upon the performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or

duty, whether or not the discretion is abused.” Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6 (2010). A

“discretionary act,” for the purposes of official immunity, is an act involving “the

exercise of individual judgment in carrying out [] official [] duties.” Kari v. City of

Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. 1998). Whether government immunity exists

is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Sletten v. Ramsey County, 675

N.W.2d 291, 299 (Minn. 2004).

Appellant purchased a municipal building in Thomson Township, intending to

remodel it into a mixed commercial and residential property. The project halted when

appellant failed to obtain the requisite building permits and certificates of occupancy.

Appellant commenced this action against respondents, which the district court dismissed

on the ground that respondents are entitled to municipal immunity. Appellant first argues

that the district court erred by granting Gulland, the township’s building official,

immunity because he incorrectly interpreted the Minnesota building code throughout the

renovation process. But even if Gulland erred in interpreting the building code, as
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appellant alleges, such an error would have occurred within his discretionary role as a

municipal official. See Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 287 Minn. 287, 288, 178

N.W.2d 215, 217 (1970) (concluding that a city employee’s oversight of a zoning

ordinance was within the discretionary function of his permit-granting role and, therefore,

entitled to immunity). The district court did not err by granting statutory immunity to

Gulland.

Appellant also asserts that Grace, a building- and fire-code consultant, was not

entitled to statutory immunity, arguing that Grace should have advocated for the use of an

alternative building code earlier in the planning process. Grace was hired by Thomson

Township and, therefore, was also acting in an official capacity on behalf of a

municipality. Thus, like Gulland, Grace is protected by municipal immunity. See id.,

178 N.W.2d at 217. The district court did not err by granting statutory immunity to

Grace.

Appellant also challenges the district court’s extension of statutory immunity to

Juntunen, the township’s fire chief, arguing that Juntunen engaged in unprotected

municipal conduct by instructing the township’s fire department not to enter the building

if there was a fire. But the record indicates that Juntunen believed that the roof of the

building would collapse if the building caught fire, and Juntunen also expressed concern

over the various fire hazards on the property. “Choice of the use of police and fire

manpower involves the use of discretion and falls squarely within the statutory exception

from liability expressed in subd. 6 of [section] 466.03.” Silver v. City of Minneapolis,

284 Minn. 266, 271, 170 N.W.2d 206, 209 (1969). Assuming that Juntunen instructed
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the fire department not to enter the building in the event of a fire, such an instruction

would be entitled to immunity as a discretionary function. See Larson v. Indep. Sch.

Dist. No. 314, 289 N.W.2d 112, 121 (Minn. 1979) (stating that statutory immunity

applies to a municipal employee “whose policy-making duties include choosing between

various alternatives, even if one of the alternatives is to do nothing”). The district court

did not err by granting statutory immunity to Juntunen.

Because Gulland, Grace, and Juntunen were all entitled to statutory immunity,

Thomson Township cannot be held liable for the actions of these officials. See

Wiederholt v. City of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Minn. 1998) (stating that

vicarious immunity “protects the governmental entity from suit based on the official

immunity of its employee”); Watson by Hanson v. Metro. Transit Comm’n, 553 N.W.2d

406, 414 (Minn. 1996) (stating that a municipality is not liable for the torts of its officials

when immunity protects the official from personal liability). The district court did not err

by granting summary judgment in favor of respondents and dismissing appellant’s

claims. Because we conclude that the district court did not err by granting summary

judgment on the grounds of statutory immunity, we do not reach appellant’s officialimmunity

argument. See Winkler v. Magnuson, 539 N.W.2d 821, 827 (Minn. App. 1995)

(stating that we may affirm summary judgment if it can be sustained on any ground),

review denied (Minn. Feb. 13, 1996).

Affirmed.